The victories and settlements of the Mexican-American War increased the expanse of the territorial United States. To control and protect this new territory and the new citizens encompassed within its boundaries or rapidly moving into the new territories, the government deployed the vast majority of the U.S. Army. Quickly, Congress and the War Department became appalled at the unexpected new cost of simply supplying the outposts scattered over the new region. The transportation cost of the Quartermaster Department alone was more than the entire pre-war budget for the whole of the United States Army.

Distances were great, and often now through arid or semi-arid country. The Army posts, once conveniently established along waterways and supplied cheaply by contract steamboats, were now hundreds of miles from water. This meant expensive civilian contracts with drayage companies or even more expensive government owned wagon trains managed, operated and maintained by large numbers of employed civilians, paid at the prevailing wage - which out west was several times higher than eastern wages. The expenses seemed never to stop. Army wagon trains, using mules or oxen, needed regularly spaced repair, water and feed depots. Water and feed points were necessary at least a days journey apart and had to be resupplied either by Army contract or supply trains. If local farmers could not deliver forage, hay and grain, to given points, then the Army had to buy it at one point and stock the feeding points or it had to carry feed for the animals which were pulling the freight Wagons. This often meant a ratio of two forage wagons to every freight wagon. If a train was outbound for a destination which could not supply livestock feed for the return journey and grazing along the route was minimal, then empty wagons (actually partially loaded wagons for the animals pulling them had to be fed) would start back for a depot point, to load up with forage to meet the homeward bound wagon column. If timely contact was not effected, costly government mules (or oxen) would die. And the feared auditors in Washington, D.C. would want to know why.

On trips east across the Great American Desert, Gwin Harris Heap, a proselytizing convert to the idea of camels as a cheap transportation methodology for the American west, foisted upon Edward F. Beale the recently published book by the Abbe Huc, Travels in Tartary, Tibet and China, During the Years 1844, 1845 and 1846. While Beale later claimed be was immediately captivated by the journal, at the time the opposite was true. It seemed to have made no impression upon him. In fact, Beale may have considered Heap somewhat a pushy zealot of a relative, for they later parted ways under less than happy circumstances.

Gwin Heap became the proponent of camel transportation and ultimately the buyer of camels when the U.S. Navy was ordered to acquire camels from Turkey and Egypt and bring them to Texas. Nowhere in government correspondence of the time is to be found any advocacy for the use of camels originating with Edward F. Beale.In fact, when Beale won the contract for a re-survey and road development along the 35th Parallel, Secretary of War John B. Floyd ordered Beale to take 25 camels to California (and return with them) as part of the expedition. Beale exploded in anger and in ink to the Secretary. He protested mightily and insisted that Floyd was wrong to order him to use the camels. Secretary Floyd stood firm: he wanted to see what these expensive forage burners, lounging about Camp Verde outside of San Antonio could do. Reluctantly Beale, who had no choice, traveled to Camp Verde, Texas, and picked up the 25 camels.

The majority of the foreign laborers hired by the U.S. Navy to work with the camels were Greek urbanites from the streets of Constantinople (modern day Istanbul) who had no experience in the employment of camels. They had seen a free ride to the United States, where it was rumored the streets were paved with gold and it was a true land of flowing milk and honey. The two Turks who were hired by the Navy, and actually knew how to handle camels were soon disillusioned by the flat Texas prairies. They wanted to go home. The Navy contract specified that all foreigners associated with the camels coming to Texas were to work six months and then, if they wished, be discharged, given a bonus, and transported home for free by the Navy. The two Turks went home. This meant that the Greeks available to Beale were absolute novices in handling the camels.

"Ned" Beale soon discovered this flaw, to his anger as his correspondence to the Secretary of War points out The Greeks seemed untrainable and totally incompetent, but in time several mastered their new chore and went on to a long historic, association with the camels which came west. The others departed the scene upon arriving in California, leaving a confusing trail for the historian to follow. Three of the men had names similar to George (Georgics, Georgious and Georges) and only one emerged out of the confusion as "Greek George": Georges Caralambo.

While Beale was moving west in the early fall of 1857, the U. S. government was moving troops westward against the Mormon colony in Utah. In California, the Mojave and Salt Lake Road connected Los Angeles, San Bernardino and Salt Lake City. The majority of citizens in, southern California harbored strong anti-Mormon attitudes. While pending "war news" filtered into California along the Salt Lake Road, a fantastic set of rumors emerged that the Mormons departing California were smuggling tons of firearms toward the Utah colony. The newspapers reflected these rumors by playing them to the hilt, often with wild embellishments. Added to the gunrunning rumors were others, particularly that Mormon special agents were organizing the desert Indians to attack "Gentile" parties crossing the Mojave Desert into southern Utah (now southern Nevada).

In the meantime, Beale had been ordered by the government to improve the 35th Parallel wagon road and to do it right this time. Immigrants had complained about the road, saying it was not in reality what Beale's propaganda said it was. For this second expedition, Beale was assigned 25 more camels, which worked well along the route. These 25 camels did not cross into California. At the same time, Bishop was using the original camels to haul freight for Beale's work crews, and his own.

There is also a great deal of undocumented story-telling on how Army camels frightened and routed herds of government horses, overturning wagons or dumping troopers on the hard ground. Attempts to confirm these stories have not proven fruitful. Rather, Army reports indicated how regularly the animals blended together in the same corrals or fields, and tolerated each other with natural ease. When the camels were introduced to the government mule corrals at the Fort Tejon Depot in November 1859, the quartermaster reported no panic, no tumult; in fact, he was surprised at how easily the animals adapted to one another. The camels, showing effects from hard labor, primarily wanted to eat, and they consumed expensive oats, barley and hay at alarming rates.

William McCleave, a former First Sergeant of Company K, 1st Dragoons, delivered the camel herd to Captain Winfield S. Hancock on or about the 19th of June 1861. The camels were placed in the government corrals at the Los Angeles Quartermaster Depot, where once again they easily mixed with the government mules. Macleave continued as chief herder until early August, when Brevet Major James H. Carleton lured the former sergeant away from Los Angeles to accept a commission as a Captain in the forming 1st Battalion of California Cavalry. Emil Fritz, another former dragoon first sergeant, also traveled to San Francisco with Carleton to accept a captaincy in that same battalion. To command the battalion, Carleton, who would become Colonel of the 1st California Infantry, gathered in Captain Benjamin Davis of Company K, who would receive the grade of Lieutenant Colonel of California Cavalry. Carleton, who was expected to lead an expedition along the California Trail, wanted his developing cavalry force commanded by former dragoons. Much to Carleton's disgust, the Governor appointed a number of men to be officers in the battalion who did not have mounted experience.

When McCleave departed for San Francisco, Charles Smith also gave up his position as assistant camel herder. McKee then sought out Hadji Alli and Georges Caralambo and hired them as camel herders for the depot. When McKee departed for the east with his regiment, the camels were left in limbo with Alli and Caralambo looking out for them. They were moved to Camp Latham, in what today is Culver City, in early December 1861.

The next two years were a period of frustration for the Army on what to do with the camels, which continued to eat while some of the females produced healthy young. When the Los Angeles depot was transferred to Camp Latham and then to Wilmington on the establishment of Drum Barracks in February 1862, the camels went along. For a short period they were the concern of George C. Alexander, the former sutler or post trader at Fort Tejon, who was the first senior clerk and financial accountant at Drum Barracks. Alexander soon gave up the clerkship, and the post quartermaster office.

First Lieut. David J. Williamson, 4th Infantry, California Volunteers, then became the guardian of the camels. Hadji Alli ("Hi-Jolly") and Georges Caralambo ("Greek George") continued to be in charge of direct supervision. The question was: what to do with the growing and useless herd? No one wanted, or had time, to bother with them.

Schemes were proposed by the Drum Barracks officers. A mail express was proposed for the San Pedro to Fort Yuma run; it was not tried. Then in late 1862 and again in early 1863 there was a proposal, by Major Clarence Bennett, to carry mail from San Pedro to Tucson, Arizona. Nothing happened. An irregular mail express was attempted from San Pedro to Camp Latham (Culver City) and from Camp Latham on to Los Angeles. A few trips were made, but then the service was dropped. Bennett then suggested a mail run to newly re-opened Fort Mojave on the Colorado River. The express was tried, but the camel foundered and died 65 miles from Los Angeles and "Hi-Jolly" once again carried the mail packet on his back across the desert on foot to reach the fort on the far side of the Colorado River.

Major Bennett then proposed sending the camels to Fort Mojave but Lieut. Williamson, the former acting assistant at Camp Latham and Drum Barracks, rigorously protested the move. He could barely feed his own mules, which were necessary for the operation of the desert fort. He had no extra forage to feed a small herd of camels. Furthermore, the camels were unsuited for the rocky desert roads of the Mojave. The camels' hooves were too tender; they became lame and were useless. Williamson declared that Edward Beale had learned this years ago, but had not reported the truth about his use of camels on the California desert floor.

At this point Federal Surveyor-General Edward F. Beale of California and Nevada, from his San Francisco office, again appeared on the scene. He requested the use of the camels in order to conduct land surveys of the uninhabited portions of the new State of Nevada. Brigadier General George Wright, then in command of the Department of the Pacific, endorsed Beale's concept and Lieut. Colonel Edwin B. Babbitt, the Department' s quartermaster, pondered the suggestion and then agreed with Wright's opinion. In reality, Babbitt felt the camels would never be "used profitably" and as early as November 1862, had recommended that the experiment be cancelled and the camels sold. However, Beale's request and the Army decision to turn the camels over to another federal agency were kicked upstairs to Washington, D.C. The Quartermaster General in Washington endorsed Wright's proposal and Wright was then about to take action when two separate developments delayed his decision.

In mid-July 1863, Captain William G. Morris, Assistant Quartermaster at Wilmington, penned a letter to Colonel Babbitt. Beale, Morris stated, only wanted part of the herd and the camels from his experiments had developed a personality problem. The camels did not like being used in small groups away from the herd. They became sulky when separated, refused to eat or drink, and on reaching a stream of water a camel would suddenly lie down in it, throwing the rider and refusing to move. On rocky or gravelly roads their feet became tender, and very sore. They became cranky and refused to take commands and often upon nearing a creek dumped their riders into the water.

In the meantime, Beale was accused of misusing government funds and of irregularities in conducting surveys. It would appear that Beale was only surveying property in which he, or his friends, had a financial interest. The main charge was that Beale had spent a great deal of his federal budget on redecorating his own office in San Francisco. The amount of $64,000 spent on new carpets and furnishings was bandied about in anti-Beale circles. Beale was suddenly in disfavor and General Wright withdrew his support.
In early September 1863, the General in Washington, D.C. wrote to Colonel Babbitt that the Department of the Pacific should sell the camels. Babbitt requested opinions from his quartermasters. Lieutenant Williamson wrote that the camels were of no use. Again, he stated the failures of their use at Camp Latham and at San Pedro. And he reminded Babbbitt that the experiments by "Lieutenant Beale and his partner Samuel Bishop" showed that mules were superior. The roads when rough and rocky crippled the animals. They were only good on sandy ground. Williamson reminded Babbitt that the recent trial run of a camel to Fort Mojave had foundered the animal just 65 miles from Los Angeles, and the mail carrier had to walk on to Fort Mojave. The express mail could be carried by "horses or mules with regularity and with much less expense to the government." Babbitt was convinced; the camels would be sold at auction as soon as possible.

A decision was made to sell the camels at auction at Benicia Arsenal. Obviously too many people in the Los Angeles area knew their weaknesses and there was an import market for camels in the San Francisco area where, after several false starts, a merchant had been bringing in Siberian camels since 1860.

Captain Morris was informed to prepare to send the camels northward at the earliest moment, but at the cheapest method. On November 19, 1863, Morris replied to Babbitt that the camels, apparently 35 or 37 in number, were "in first rate condition for the trip to Benicia Depot." However, he was delayed in forwarding them due to the heavy winter storms along the coast route. After two years of terrible drought, it was raining. Morris also considered that the current storms would produce grass along the coastal road, allowing the animals to be fed cheaply enroute. The camels were started north in late December 1863. For a brief period Morris thought of shipping them by sea, but the cost of feeding them was unreasonable and so Morris decided the final answer was to drive them overland.

The camels reached Santa Barbara on December 30, 1863 and the herders held them there while they celebrated the coming of the New Year. Then they crossed the mountains and moved on to the Salinas Valley and progressed to Mission San Jose. They skirted the south end of the bay and traveled up the east road of the shoreline of the Contra Costa, arriving at the landing site for Martinez on January 17, 18 64. The next day the camels were ferried across the lower Carquinez Straits to the government wharf at Benicia Arsenal and were then moved to the corrals behind the stone constructed buildings at the Benicia Quartermaster Depot. They were placed in the open corrals; they were not stabled in any of the fairly newly buildings at the depot.1

Auction notices were published and on February 26, 1864, the gavel came down on each camel as a separate government item. The high bidder for almost all the camels was Samuel McLeneghan, who reputedly had worked with the government camels earlier. However, nowhere in government employment hiring records was McLeneghan's name found. The 37 camels brought only $1,945, much to the grief of the Benicia Depot's quartermaster for be had expected more active bidding and a higher sales profit. Apparently McLeneghan was the only bidder, and the auctioneer had trouble getting any response from the meager crowd that showed up. McLeneghan got the whole herd for $52.56 each.

The next day, the Benicia quartermaster wrote a report to his senior in the Department of the Pacific headquarters in San Francisco. He expressed his regrets that the total amount of money was so low, explaining that few of the people who attended were interested in putting forth money for camels. He had hoped for more; the auctioneer had tried mightily to encourage the group of interested or curious spectators, but at least the camels were sold. The experiment in California was over. As consolation he offered a thought of relief: "They have been but a source of expense for years past."

Author's Note: For years I have worked on the fascinating, if disappointing, story of the camel experiment in the West. I have plowed through clouds of myths and good stories, and have been supported by the ongoing humor of my colleagues in this business. My friends have sent numerous new clues, or badly interpreted or footnoted tales of the camels. But there is one last tale. Humboldt Lagoons State Park has been one of my history projects with the Department of Parks and Recreation and the lagoons are located in Humboldt County, far away from Fort Tejon, Drum Barracks and Benicia Arsenal. Yet, the camels haunt me.

In mid-1865, two camels of government vintage were sold by McLeneghan, or his associates, to the Portland, Oregon, Zoo. They were placed aboard the ocean going steamer, the Brother Jonathan, in the same compartment where George Wright's big black riding horse was also stabled, and the ship steamed out of San Francisco for the Columbia River. Off Crescent City the Brother Jonathan struck a submerged rock and went down, with only a few of the human passengers surviving. All the animals aboard were lost. Several weeks later, on the long sandbar which blocks Stone Lagoon from the ocean, the bodies of General Wright's horse and a "Fort Tejon camel" washed ashore. The local ranchers were forced to bury the stinking carcasses. One just cannot get away from the Army camels.

The "Camel Barns" at Benicia Arsenal are not camel barns. The elongated double tiered stone buildings were "construction buildings" where the Quartermaster Department manufactured equipment or altered civilian items purchased on the open market prior to delivery to the troops in the field. Later, the buildings were used for storage as warehouses.

And the bad: